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Abstract.. The current definition of Constructive mathematics as “mathematics within intuitionist logic” ignores two fundamental issues. First, the kind of organization of the theory at issue. I show that intuitionist logic governs a problem-based organization, whose model is alternative to that of the deductive-axiomatic organization, governed by classical logic. Moreover, this dichotomy is independent of that of the kind of infinity, either potential or actual, to which respectively correspond constructive mathematical and classical mathematical tools. According to this view a mathematical theory is based on the choices regarding these two dichotomies. As an example of this kind of foundation, arithmetic is rationally re-founded on constructive mathematical tools and the model of the problem-based organization. In conclusion, constructive mathematics is not only mathematics making use of constructive tools in intuitionist logic but also organized according to around a basic problem, solved by a method discovered using intuitionist logic.
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1. An endless debate: Intuitionists vs. Formalists
A hundred years after the birth of intuitionism Martin-Loef summarized the main issues of the Hilbert-Brouwer controversy over the foundations of Mathematics​[1]​. Each side presented an exclusivist point of view, respectively classical Mathematics (ClM) only, or intuitionist Mathematics only. Historians of mathematics have not reached a clear conclusion concerning this debate. Subsequent mathematicians launched research programmes aimed at solving this controversy. Martin-Loef remarked however that they did not achieve their aims.  It is then not surprising that 
There is currently a general malaise about the logical approach to the foundations of mathematics. One main reason is that foundational thought in this century has been dominated by a few global views about the nature of mathematics – logicism, formalism, platonism and constructivism – each of which has proved to be defective in substantial ways, while nothing else has come to take their place.​[2]​ 
Most mathematicians overcome this malaise by assuming a liberal (or ecumenical) attitude, which formally accepts both kinds of Mathematics, as well as the two kinds of logic, classical (CL) and intuitionist (IL) as merely different technical tools, possibly axiomatized.  
In the meantime, however, other mathematicians suggested some new kinds of Mathematics with similar foundations to intuitionist Mathematics: Recursive Mathematics (Goedel), Computability theory (Turing), algorithmic Mathematics (Markov), constructive Mathematics (CoM) (Bishop)​[3]​. From a philosophical viewpoint the last is the most interesting. By abandoning many philosophical claims of the intuitionists, Bishop was successful in discovering the counterparts of most of the results of ClM through not excessively complex technical tools. His mathematics made many intuitionist problems simpler and easier. Moreover, it includes a clear constructive test for many ClM results: the validity or not of the limited principle of omniscience (LPO: Given a subset of integers N, and given an integer number a, either there exists an integer n belonging to N such that a = n, or a ≠ n for all n). The constructive rejection of this principle implies the rejection of a qualitatively significant part of ClM, qualified as idealistic or Platonist in nature. 
Hence, since 1967 two clearly defined formulations of Mathematics exist and the old polemic between formalists and intuitionists may be conceived in these new terms as a comparison between two well-defined kinds of mathematics, as I will do in the following. 

2. What is the alternative nature of constructive Mathematics? What is its relationship with logic?
In pragmatic terms, from a constructivist viewpoint, ClM is committed to some debatable philosophical assumptions that justify results without constructive support. From a ClM viewpoint, CoM represents a cumbersome way of achieving most of the basic results shared by both kinds of Mathematics; moreover, CoM methods imply certain limitations to a mathematician’s creativity.  
In philosophical terms, the above alternative between ClM and CoM is commonly considered unclear  owing to Bishop’s philosophically ill-defined attitude. He abandoned Brouwer’s subjectivist viewpoint in favour of an objectivist viewpoint, which however seems to be compatible with both a radical rejection of ClM - and a more liberal attitude, preferring one of them on the grounds of its mathematical advantages​[4]​. 
The constructivist can adopt one of two possible positions with respect to mathematical practice. The more traditional position is that of radical constuctivism. The radical constructivist takes it that classical mathematics is absolutely illegitimate and cannot be rendered coherent under any interpretation. Brouwer was a radical constructivist: as is Dummett. The liberal constructivist, on the other hand, believes that constructive mathematics is preferable to classical mathematics, but that classical mathematics is at least coherent. The constructive mathematicians Fred Richman and Douglas Bridges appear to be liberal constructivists. It is my view that Bishop’s defence of constructive mathematics is not adequate for either a radical or a liberal form of constructivism. I will argue that Bishop’s arguments do not adequately support radical constructivism. Bishop’s arguments do support liberal constructivism, but the basic premises that he relies on are too controversial arid counter-intuitive to be adopted without support. Bishop’s philosophical defence of constructive mathematics cannot be considered to be adequate, even on the most generous reading.​[5]​ 
	Brouwer and constructivists required a construction for every mathematical object. At the present time, liberal advocates of CoM suggest that this kind of Mathematics is “mathematics within intuitionist logic” (IL)​[6]​, in particular without the LEM, or even better, the double negation law​[7]​. The two characterizations are grosso modo complementary, since within IL we speak on one hand of propositions enjoying constructive support through affirmative propositions, which hold true also in CL; and on the other hand, of propositions lacking constructive support, hence in their cases the double negation law fails and they have to be expressed by means of doubly negated propositions, called DNP.
	However, this suggestion does not specify which philosophical position is assumed with respect to the two kinds of logic: liberal or radical? Being of a philosophical nature, the standpoint on logic cannot differ from that on mathematics; if the constructivists’ position on logic is radical, then CoM also has to be considered by them radically, i.e. the parts based on non-constructivist  concepts of ClM have to be rejected. If not, a liberal position on the kind of logic is required. Indeed, at the present time the position of almost all logicians is liberal because, since Heyting ‘axiomatized’ IL the axiomatic position is shared by all intuitionists too. In other words, the advocates of CoM have moved the question of the justification of CoM into a question about the foundations of Logic rather than of Mathematics, where, owing to the dominant position among the logicians, a liberal position is implicitly understood. 
	I conclude that not only Bishop but also present constructivists do not offer a clearly defined justification of their philosophical position. 

	3. Which kind of organization for intuitionist logic? 
	Heyting warned that the axiomatic of an intuitionist theory is not the true theory, because its full content of an intuitionist theory cannot be grasped by any formal axiomatic​[8]​. Unfortunately, he did not detail his warning. Hence, he left open the intuitionist problem of looking for a more adequate formalization of IL than an axiomatic one. I do not know of any constructivist comment on this point. It seems that constructivists dropped this warning.
	Let us remark that an implication is a clear-cut result in the case of CL, where implications derive infinite consequences from a fixed number of particular axioms (as e.g. the classical LPO), so that the result is a closed theory. An intuitionist implication between two DNPs is different from a classical, material implication, since the former cannot be decided by LEM. Moreover, a DNP cannot play the role of an axiom of a (sequence of) affirmative propositions. Hence, IL leads to the construction of “open theories”. 
	Is then IL (and CoM) a theory without a clear kind of organization? More in general, the question is whether there exists an organization of a mathematical theory which is alternative to the deductive-axiomatic one. An examination of past mathematical theories shows that it was Lobachevsky who first (implicitly) suggested a model for such an organization which he called a problem-based organization (PO)​[9]​. Many other scientific theories have been (implicitly) presented by the respective authors according to this same model​[10]​. I will present it through the main steps of its theoretical development. The first step is the declaration of a basic problem and the author’s way of reasoning is based on DNPs. Through DNPs the author constructs ad absurdum proofs, each inferring a DNP, ¬¬ t, which within IL cannot be translated into t. However, it can work as a premise to a subsequent ad absurdum proof, so as to constitute a chain of ad absurdum proofs. They infer a final predicate ¬¬ T. Owing to the logical evidence accumulated by previous reasoning, at this stage of theoretical development an author translates the final predicate into the corresponding affirmative proposition, T; from which all derivations in CL are drawn; they are then compared with known facts. 
In order to clarify this logical translation let us examine the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Leibniz explains that the proposition (“Nothing is without reason”) is not equivalent to the corresponding affirmative proposition (“Everything has a reason”), because objective evidence for the latter proposition is lacking​[11]​. Since this lack implies the failure of the double negation law, Leibniz implicitly attributed to IL the proposition of PSR. Moreover, an application of PSR leads to establishing the specific reason at issue, i.e. to obtain from the doubly negated predicate ¬¬ T - in Leibnz’s terms, a contingent proposition, defined by him as “a proposition whose contrary is not contradictory”, i.e. a DNP – the corresponding affirmative proposition T – in Leibniz’s terms, a necessary proposition. Thus, the last step of the new theoretical organization, i.e. the author’s translation, is governed by an application of PSR to ¬¬ T. Markov has implicitly suggested that an application of PSR is correct when the predicate is both decidable and derived from an ad absurdum proof​[12]​. 
	In the light of the model of a PO, Heyting’s axiomatization cannot be the only formalization of IL. Indeed, in the almost the same year Kolmogorov, without mentioning the word “axiomatic”, suggested a new formulation of IL; it was conceived as a calculus of the resolutions of problems; it can replace Heyting’s axiomatic of IL​[13]​. The development of Kolmogorov’s formal theory proceeds through AAPs, which conclude with a predicate to which the PSR is applied. In sum, its organization fits the model of a PO​[14]​. 
	In conclusion, one has to consider a (logical) dichotomy regarding the kind of organization of a theory: either axiomatic, governed by CL, or problem-based, governed by IL. 
	How important are the differences between AO and PO? A PO of a theory makes clear the problem to be solved, and then declares the direction of his research through a methodological principle; it obtains a new scientific method by inductive reasoning and finally performs a creative step by a (controlled) application of the PSR. On the other hand, an AO has to justify the assumed axioms in non-formal terms (not an easy task), prove the three classical features of these axioms (independence, completeness and consistency; after Goedel we well know that this task is impossible) and develop the theory through an endless number of theorems. It is apparent that the main merit of an AO, i.e. to assure certain deductions from few axioms, does not compensate for its critical points; whereas the main merit of a PO, i.e. that of leading to the discovery of a new scientific method, does not compensate for the not entirely certain path of discovery. In sum, both models of organization have merits and defects; there is no reason to attribute to AO a monopoly of the theoretical organization of a scientific theory. 

	4. What is the constructive formulation of Arithmetic?
	To state – as Bridges and other constructivist mathematicians do – that CoM is Mathematics within IL does not specify the kind of the theoretical organization of CoM. In the previous section we saw that if Mathematics is to be organized as a systematic theory, it has to be organized in one of the two possibe ways, either axiomatic or problem-based. Can CoM be developed not only according to IL but also organized as a PO and therefore governed by IL? I.e., can CoM be re-formulated by first establishing the basic problem to be solved, then by some DNPs that suggest the direction of the search for a new mathematical method capable of solving the given problem?
	Let us apply the PO model to a simple case of CoM, Arithmetic. 
	We can suggest that its basic problem is (Dedekind): “What are integer numbers?” Dummett suggests an IL formulation​[15]​; but I would change two critical steps. According to Peano the basic definition concerns the “successor” operation; yet, a successor allows an a priori indefinite step forward however long; therefore in order for the theory to be categorical, and hence to avoid any successor’s leap to much larger numbers, the definition of the ‘successor’ operation has essentially to include the word ‘only’ = ‘not other than’, i.e. a DNP. Hence, the theory essentially relies on IL.
	The second crucial step of the construction of arithmetic theory is the introduction of the principle of induction (PI), which, according Poincaré, represents the ultimate principle of mathematical reasoning, condensing through a unique formula an infinity of syllogisms, hence making it possible to proceed from the finite to the infinity: a property P(n) on a finite sequence of integers, a property for which the theorem holds that P(n) implies P(n+1), is extended to the infinite sequence of all n. At least once Poincaré stated PI through two cumbersome DNPs; the former defines the property P(n) as “the absence of contradiction“ (incidentally this proposition constitutes a DNP); and the latter defines the non-existence of a number for which this property holds true: ¬Ǝ n¬ P(n): 
Si l'absence de contradiction au moment d'un syllogisme dont le numéro est entier entraîne l'absence de contradiction au moment dont le numéro est le suivant, on n'aura à craindre aucune contradiction pour aucun des syllogismes dont le numéro est entier​[16]​.
	It is easy to formalize this doubly negated version of PI; however, I add an intermediate step to make it easier: “Si l'absence de contradiction [P(n)] au moment d'un syllogisme dont le numéro est entier entraîne l'absence de contradiction au moment dont le numéro est le suivant [P(n+1)], on n'aura à craindre [¬Ǝ n] aucune contradiction pour aucun [¬P(n)] des syllogismes dont le numéro est entier. At last: 
			 {(nεN) ₽(n) → ₽(n+1)} → ¬ Ǝ n¬ P(n) 
	This version of Poincaré’s of PI was called by Hilbert “intuitive” (inhaltlich)​[17]​, in contrast with the only adequate principle according to the Formalist philosophy, i.e. the principle with a quantifier at the beginning and moreover concluding an affirmative predicate, Ɐn P(n). 
	Poincaré then added an AAP: “Otherwise the whole of Mathematics represents a giant tautology”. Now PSR can be correctly applied to a previous doubly negated predicate, resulting from an ad absurdum proof. This application translates it into its affirmative version Ɐn P(n) (i.e. the same result as the implication in CL of the previous conclusion, i.e. according to the Formalist philosophy which disregards the constructive support for its derivations). 
	After this application of the PSR​[18]​, cancelling the double negation in the previous version of the induction principle, we obtain what is commonly called Heyting Arithmetic, a theory which again makes use of constructive tools and also of IL in the remaining parts. This persistence is justified by what Dummett wrote: there “are few theorems… in textbooks of classical number theory” that are different from those obtained by Heyting arithmetic. He adds: “Since the two theories are very different in principle, this is an indication of to how small an extent classical number theorists have succeeded in exploiting their Platonist assumptions“ in the case of the arithmetic. 
	But the true intuitionist theory of Arithmetic diverges from Peano arithmetic not only in its mathematical development but also in its basic premisses. While Poincaré formulated arithmetic theory as a whole according to IL because his version of PI is also a doubly negated predicate, Heyting’s arithmetic ignores both the above stated basic problem of Arithmetic and the IL version of PI. 
	Being entirely formalized in their respective kinds of logic, the resulting two formulations of Arithmetic, the classical one and the present one, are equally valid; there is no valid reason for underrating one of them. 

	5. Constructive mathematics as the alternative formulation of classical mathematics 
	The above new formulation of Arithmetic suggests how to re-construct all other mathematical theories according to a PO governed by IL. We can obtain in a similar way two formulations of mathematics as a whole, ClM and CoM, the former in CL and the latter in IL. They together formalize objectively and sharply the old philosophical dichotomy – known since Aristotle’s time – between potential infinity (PI) – which underlies constructive tools - and actual infinity (AI) – which underlies the idealist ideas of CM. 
	In sum, there exist two dichotomies underlying Mathematics. Notice that each choice regarding a dichotomy gives rise to results that are incompatible with those obtained by the alternative choice. In the case of of the dichotomy regarding the mathematical tools the undecidabilities of CoM do not occur in ClM; viceversa the mathematical existences that in ClM are obtained without constructive tools do not pertain to CoM. In the case of the dichotomy regarding the kind of logic the consequence of the failure of the double negation law is that the results obtained using the two kinds of logic, CL and IL, are incompatible. Given these mutual incompatibilities two theories based on different pairs of choices are mutually incommensurable theories. 
	In retrospect, we note that they were incommensurable also in a historical sense. First Hilbert formulated a mathematical theory – Euclidean geometry -  structurally, i.e. by basing it on two well-defined choices, i.e. the axiomatic method (AO) and the use of AI. However, he did not know that this was only one way to found a mathematical theory. By initiating a new Mathematics, essentially based on the opposite choices (PO&PI) to those of Hilbert, Brouwer without knowing it created a pluralism of FOM. But the antagonistic nature of the respective choices regarding both the kinds of mathematics and the kinds of logic led both Brouwer and Hilbert to be exclusivist and therefore to reject the results of the other’s mathematics. Brouwer emphasized the constructive nature of mathematical objects (PI), but he and the intuitionists did not investigate previous mathematical (and scientific) theories; we saw that this kind of investigation would reveal a new structural feature to be introduced into intuitionism, the problem-based organization. The lack of awareness of this structure was the main deficiency of the intuitionist school. On the other hand, Hilbert rejected any possibility of basing mathematical theories on PI (he only invoked an ill-defined “finitism” for its metamathematics); his slogan “In mathematics there is no Ignorabimus!)” was wrong, as Goedel showed when he proved his celebrated theorem that inferred an undecidability. In addition, Hilbert also excluded the other choice because he did not recognize either an alternative organization to the axiomatic one, or a logic other than CL.  From the point of view of the two choices, a more radical opposition between these two mathematicians was not possible.
	From what has been said so far it is clear what is essentially meant by a mathematical theory; it is a structure determined by two choices, one concerning the kind of mathematical infinity, to which corresponds the kind of mathematical tools - constructive or not -, and the other, concerning the kind of organization, to which corresponds  the kind of logic. Moreover these choices are at the same time philosophical in nature, since they refer to the philosophical notions of infinity and organization, and scientific in nature, since they are made by a scientist founding a scientific theory. Their precision and wide range of applicability allow us to dismiss the essentially philosophical categories – eg Billinge’s liberal/radical distinction – usually suggested to characterize not the foundation of mathematics but the vague notion of  standpoint regarding the foundations of mathematics;
	Brouwer rejected some of Hilbert’s results (those derived from the use of actual infinity) and viceversa Hilbert rejected Brouwer’s results (e.g. undecidabilities). At the present time we see that they were incorrect, because the separation exists within the foundations of Mathematics itself, not within a mathematician’s mind; e.g. the LPO no longer implies a philosophical dilemma in a mathematician’s mind – whether to choose a liberal or a radical stance -, but an objective split within the foundations of Mathematics. Once the two previous dichotomies within respectively mathematics and logic are acknowledged, the only appropriate standpoint is a pluralist one that considers each basic choice regarding each dichotomy to be legitimate and on a par with each other.
	As a consequence of the above I suggest a new definition of CoM: constructive mathematics is mathematics that makes use of constructive tools and is organized to solve a fundamental problem using a method that is governed by intuitionist logic. This definition preserves the commonly stated link of CoM with IL, but adds to it the corresponding kind of organization of the theory – a problem-based one - and moreover does not dismiss  Brouwer’s original choice of only constructive tools, because dice che c’è un the di troppo the latter choice is independent of both the kind of logic and the kind of organization of the theory.
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